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Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003000410001-2

State Department review completed

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9 April 1957

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Copy No. 134

# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

41  
X  
CLASS: CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2005  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 12-27-75 REVIEWER: [redacted]

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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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## 1. INDONESIAN CABINET ANNOUNCED BY SUKARNO

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President Sukarno's 23-member "emergency extraparliamentary business cabinet" contains at least four well-known fellow-travelers, including a recipient of the Stalin "peace prize" as minister of education. The remainder are either non-party technicians or second-rate political leaders. The Communist Party promptly welcomed the new cabinet and praised it as "politically appropriate and reliable."

Sukarno announced his cabinet after meeting with, and presumably gaining the approval of, the prospective ministers, the chiefs of staff of the three armed services, the chief of police, the president of the supreme court and the attorney general. The fact that members of the Masjumi and the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) are included reflects the effectiveness of Sukarno's pressure tactics.

The prime minister-designate and acting defense minister is Raden Djuanda, a non-party man who has been director of state planning since 1953. Djuanda is non-Communist and technically competent, but is not a strong personality and is likely to be easily manipulated by Sukarno. The foreign minister-designate, Subandrio, has been secretary general of the Foreign Ministry. He is a former ambassador to the USSR, and has been chiefly responsible for Indonesia's acceptance of a large-scale Soviet aid agreement.

The non-Javanese areas probably will be highly dissatisfied with the new cabinet. Although at least four members were born in the "outer islands," none is known to be a champion of local autonomy. Moreover, no provision is made for the participation of former vice president Hatta.

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### 3. NASR SHAKES LIBYAN KING'S CONFIDENCE IN PRIME MINISTER

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Egypt, which in recent years has exerted considerable influence in Libya, apparently is carrying out a major effort to recoup its losses suffered there in recent months. Egyptian president Nasr appears to have successfully discredited pro-Western prime minister Ben Halim in the eyes of King Idris by sending the king "documentary evidence" that Ben Halim and his family have been implicated in illegal transfers of money from Egypt. The king, who is suspicious of his advisers, might dismiss the prime minister, according to the American ambassador in Tripoli.

Ben Halim has been under Egyptian attack since last November, when he became alarmed at the extent of Egyptian penetration and influence in Libya and ousted the Egyptian military attaché for subversive activities. Ben Halim has given Libya a stable government and has recently sought to restrict Soviet influence.

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#### 4. TURKISH POSITION ON CYPRUS

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The Turks view recent developments in the Cyprus controversy with increasing alarm, and consider them to be detrimental to Turkish interests. A 4 April aide-memoire setting forth their views is "more threatening" than anything previously, according to Ambassador Warren.

The document, drafted after consultation between the Turkish authorities and Dr. Gazil Kuchuk, leader of the Turkish Cypriots, denounced Archbishop Makarios and the Greek government and re-emphasized the "vital importance" of the Cyprus issue to Turkey. It warned that the reaction in Turkey and among Cypriot Turks which would follow any future negotiations with Makarios "should be carefully and seriously thought over!"

The Turks firmly oppose any negotiations between Makarios and the British, even if held concurrently with tripartite negotiations among Britain, Greece and Turkey. According to the aide-memoire, the Turks no longer consider self-government or any other provisional arrangement possible, but demand partition of the island as the only acceptable solution.

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## 5. UNSTABLE POLITICAL SITUATION IN PAKISTAN

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The opening of a new session of Pakistan's National Assembly on 8 April finds the political situation in the country extremely unstable. President Mirza and Prime Minister Suhrawardy cannot agree on a chief minister for a new government in West Pakistan, and until they do they cannot end President's Rule in the province and restore democratic government. Continued failure to achieve a stable provincial government in West Pakistan would prevent the National Assembly from functioning effectively, since a workable coalition in the National Assembly depends on settlement of the Republican Party-Moslem League rivalry at the provincial level.

Suhrawardy is also finding it difficult to maintain control of his own party, the Awami League, in East Pakistan, where he is still challenged by the pro-Communist Maulana Bhashani. The East Pakistan Awami League has failed at two meetings either to make a clean break with Bhashani by accepting his proffered resignation as party president or to get him to remain within the party on Suhrawardy's terms. Bhashani's continued influence is indicated by the passage on 3 April by the East Pakistan assembly of a resolution demanding autonomy for the province in all matters except defense, foreign affairs, and currency.

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